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Despite the importance of the hypothesis that trade creditors may act as relationship lenders, 
it has been virtually impossible to directly test this hypothesis because of a lack of data.  We 
attempt to overcome this problem by using a relatively new Japanese database on small and 
midsized enterprises (SMEs) that contains information on the strength of the buyer-seller 
relationship.  We find some evidence that trade creditors may be relationship lenders.   
However, we also find evidence that trade creditors may be financial statement lenders.  Our 
results are generally quite sensitive to model specification in both our “quantity” and “terms 
of credit” regressions.  Thus, our results can only be viewed as suggestive of the possibility 
that trade creditors acquire private soft information over time and use this information to set 
the terms of trade financing. 
   
Keywords: Trade Credit, Relationship Lending, Credit Availability, Information 
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  2I.  Introduction 
  It is not surprising that trade credit has garnered considerable attention in the 
academic literature given its ubiquitous nature.  It has been noted that its importance as a 
source of external finance may be even greater for SMEs than for larger firms (e.g.,  Mian 
and Smith 1992, 1994, Biais and Gollier 1997).  It has also been noted that trade credit may 
be more important in countries where bank relationships are not strong, where financial 
markets are less developed, and where the legal system is weak (e.g., Breig 1994, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic 2002, and Fisman and Love 2003).  Nevertheless, even in developed 
countries such as Japan and the United States, SMEs depend heavily on trade credit:  In Japan 
and the United States trade credit accounts for 30% and 32% of all debt extended to SMEs 
respectively.
1  
  Despite the abundance of articles on trade credit in the literature, there is very little 
agreement on the nature and motivation for the use of trade credit.  There is no shortage of 
theories.  Some theories of trade credit emphasize an operations-oriented motivation for trade 
credit while other theories emphasize a financial motivation.  Many of the financial theories 
either explicitly or implicitly emphasize that trade creditors (i.e., product sellers) acquire 
private information about buyers that facilitates their extension of credit to these customers.  
In particular, some authors have argued that trade creditors acquire private information that is 
similar – in some cases, superior – to the information acquired by banks (e.g, Mian and Smith 
1992, Biais and Gollier 1997, Cook 1999, Jain 2001, Cunat 2005, Miwa and Ramseyer 2005, 
Fabri and Menichini 2006).  To the extent that trade creditors acquire soft information in 
order to monitor their customers and use this information to make credit decisions they act, 
                                                        
1 The ratio for the Japan is from the 2002 Survey of the Financial Environment conducted by 
the Japanese Small and Medium Enterprise Agency.  The ratio for the U.S. is from Berger and 
Udell (1998). 
  3like banks, as relationship lenders. 
  This relationship lending view of trade credit has been a long standing hypothesis in 
the academic literature on the motivation of trade credit.  Consider the following statement 
from the literature review contained in one of the earlier seminal papers on trade credit:  
“Monitoring of credit worthiness of an account debtor can occur as a by-product of selling if 
the manufacturer’s sales representative regularly visits the borrower (Mian and Smith 1992, p. 
172).”  One recent paper has argued that trade creditors are even better at monitoring (i.e., 
relationship lending) than banks noting that because “bankers seldom know their borrowers’ 
industries first-hand, they rely on guarantees and security interests [while because] trade 
partners know those industries well, they instead monitor their borrowers closely (Miwa and 
Ramseyer 2005, p.1).” 
  Despite the importance of the hypothesis that trade creditors act as relationship 
lenders, it has been virtually impossible to conduct a direct test because of a lack of data that 
have information on both  1) the terms of trade credit, and 2) the strength of the buyer-seller 
relationship.  We overcome this problem by using a relatively new Japanese database on 
small and midsized enterprises (SMEs) that contains information on both 1) and 2) as well as 
information about the firm itself.  In this paper we find some evidence that trade creditors 
may be relationship lenders in both our regressions for trade credit terms and for trade credit 
quantity.  However, these results are not robust to alternative specifications.  Interestingly we 
also obtain some evidence that trade creditors may be financial statement lenders, although 
this finding is likewise not robust.  We view our results as suggestive of the possibility that 
trade creditors acquire private soft information as well as hard information over time and use 
such information to set the terms of trade financing.  This should not, however, be interpreted 
  4as being inconsistent with other theories of trade credit such as the operations-oriented 
theories of trade credit because these motivations for trade credit are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  
  The remainder of our paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 offers a brief review 
of the literature on trade credit.  Section 3 discusses our data and methodology.  This 
discussion also highlights the advantage of our data set and the information it provides on the 
terms of trade credit and the strength of the buyer-seller relationship.  Section 4 presents our 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
II.  The Literature on Trade Credit 
Many different theories have been offered to explain the wide-spread use of trade 
credit with some empirical support for many of them.  As noted in one recent paper, most 
theories of trade credit fit into one of two broad categories: theories based on real operations 
and theories based on financial aspects (Frank and Maksomovic 2005).
2   Real operations-
based theories offer a variety of motivations including transaction cost minimization, price 
discrimination, and quality guarantees (e.g., Ferris 1981, Emery 1987, Brennan, Maksimovic 
and Zechner 1988, Long, Malitz and Ravid 1993, Emery and Nayar 1998).  
Financial theories of trade credit take different forms.  Many papers suggest that 
trade creditors may have certain advantages in contracting over bank lenders.  Some papers 
argue that trade creditors have an advantage related to product collateral value.  For example, 
this can arise if suppliers place a higher value on their product as collateral than banks or if 
trade suppliers have superior liquidation ability or a security interest in their product that 
                                                        
2  For a more comprehensive literature review see  Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Burkart, 
Ellingsen and Giannetti (2004). 
  5dominates a bank’s claim (e.g., Mian and Smith 1992, Frank and Maksomovic 2005, Santos 
and Longhofer 2003).  One paper argues that trade creditors may make more concessions in 
renegotiation than banks because they incur sunk costs that are specific to their customers 
(Wilner 2000).   Another paper argues that trade creditors may have a repayment enforcement 
mechanism that is superior to that of banks in that they can strategically withhold supplies 
(Cunat 2005). Some recent work also emphasizes creditor vulnerability to product diversion 
(Burkart and Ellingsen 2004, Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti 2004).   
Many papers also argue that trade creditors acquire private information about their 
customers (e.g, Mian and Smith 1992, Biais and Gollier 1997, Cook 1999, Jain 2001, Cunat 
2005, Miwa and Ramseyer 2005, Fabri and Menichini 2006).  The information acquired by 
trade creditors need not be the same information that banks acquire.  For example, one paper 
models banks and trade creditors as receiving different signals about buyer quality with banks 
being induced to lend based on the observed availability of trade credit (e.g., Biais and 
Gollier 1997).  While the notion that trade creditors, like banks, accumulate information over 
time as the strength of the relationship grows (or as its breadth widens) is not explicitly 
modeled in the trade credit literature, this notion is consistent with the spirit of many of the 
information-based models of trade credit.  Despite the lack of an explicit model, the 
hypothesis that trade creditors are relationship lenders (in the pure sense of linking the 
accumulation of private information with the strength of the relationship) is well established 
in the literature (e.g., Mian and Smith 1992, and Cunat 2005, Miwa and Ramseyer 2005). 
There is also a literature that primarily focuses on whether trade credit and bank 
credit are substitutes with most but not all finding that they are (Meltzer 1960, Jaffee 1968, 
Ramey 1992, Marotta 1996, Cook 1999, Ono 2001, Tsuruta 2003, Uesugi and Yamashiro 
  62004).  We will also investigate this issue by examining whether the length of the buyer-seller 
relationship has an effect on the terms of bank credit. 
The only empirical evidence of which we are aware that links buyer-seller 
relationship strength with trade credit is indirect in the sense that firm age is used as proxy for 
the length of the relationship.  While the typical empirical result has been that dependence on 
trade credit declines with age, one paper found that dependence on trade credit initially grows 
for new firms and then later levels off as a fraction of debt over the firm’s life cycle (Cunat 
2005).  However, using age as a proxy may be problematic because the age of the firm could 
just as well be a proxy for publicly available information about the firm (e.g., Berger and 
Udell 1995).  Our proxy for the relationship strength is considerably more powerful than firm 
age – the length of the relationship between the SME and its main supplier.  Moreover, we are 
able to control for firm age which essentially allows us to control for publicly available 
information about the firm.  In addition, we can also control for the availability of verifiable 
financial information in the form of audited financial statements.  
In contrast to the paucity of data on the strength of the buyer-seller relationship 
discussed in the previous paragraph, there is a widely-held belief in the literature that the 
terms of trade credit are well known and, to lesser extent, uniform.  In particular, it is 
generally assumed in the literature that trade credit is an extremely expensive form of 
external finance – considerably more expensive than bank loans. Typically the cost of trade 
credit is estimated in a mechanical way that assumes a standard pricing menu that features a 
discount for early payment and a final maturity.  The terms most frequently described in the 
literature are a 2% discount in 10 days and a net (i.e., maturity) of 30 days (e.g., Petersen and 
Rajan 1994, 1995, 1997, Cunat 2005).  These pricing terms make trade credit very expensive 
  7during the 20 day period after the discount with an effective annual rate over 40%.     
However, recent criticism in the literature has emphasized that this approach may be 
too simplistic (Miwa and Ramseyer 2005).  These critics note that researchers on trade credit 
typically “offer little actual evidence on the usurious” terms of trade credit.  For example, it 
appears from the Federal Reserve’s National Survey of Small Business Finance that two-
thirds or more of suppliers do not offer discounts at all (see Petersen and Rajan 1994, Burkart, 
Ellingsen and Giannetti 2004).  In addition, the “real” maturity may be significantly longer 
than the stated maturity.
3  Most problematic, however, is the fact that the price of the 
underlying product is not observable to the empiricist.  Thus, with information on this key 
element of the pricing menu, it is distinctly possible that trade credit is no more expensive 
than bank credit (Miwa and Ramseyer 2005). 
Our survey data allow us to incorporate in our analysis the “real maturity” of trade 
credit.  We argue that this is a notable improvement over the extant literature that has only 
analyzed the “stated maturity” (e.g., Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti 2004).  Further, we feel 
that our variable based on the real maturity of trade credit likely better captures an overall 
tightening of credit terms.
4     
 
III.  Data and Methodology 
To examine the hypothesis that trade creditors are relationship lenders we exploit a 
unique data set from a survey of Japanese SMEs that contains information about the strength 
of the relationship that an SME has with its main supplier.  Our data source is the Survey of 
                                                        
3 Lenders in the U.S. who factor accounts receivables or lend against accounts receivable under a 
factoring or asset-based loan contract do not generally consider an account as ineligible as 
collateral until the invoice is over 90 days old. 
4 In future extensions of this research we will be able to construct a variable that also incorporates 
changes in the pricing of the goods. 
  8the Financial Environment (SFE) that was conducted on November 2002 by the Japanese 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, which is affiliated with the Japanese Ministry of Trade, 
Economy, and Industry (METI). In many ways the SFE survey is similar to the Survey of 
Small Business Finance (SSBF) in the US.  Like the SSBF the SFE asks about financing 
issues of SMEs in Japan as of October 31, 2002 including numerous questions about how 
respondent firms obtain their financing.  Unlike the SSBF – and most importantly for our 
study -- the SFE also asks about the length of the relationship that an SME has with its main 
supplier.
5
Our main empirical tests take the form: 
 
Terms of Trade Credit = f (strength of the buyer-seller relationship, firm and  
entrepreneur control variables, regional and bank controls)    (1) 
 
Amount of Trade Credit = f (strength of the buyer-seller relationship, firm and  
entrepreneur control variables, regional and bank controls)    (2) 
 
From the survey we construct two variables for our proxies of terms of trade credit: 
SHORTEN and LENGTHEN.  First, SHORTEN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if the respondent SME answered “shortened” to the question on trade credit, “Over the past 
one year, did your company’s terms of payment change?”
6  It seems likely that most 
respondents would interpret this question as referring to the “real maturity” trade credit, 
although there is some ambiguity that could lead some respondents to it more narrowly to 
mean just the stated maturity.  Second, LENGTHEN is a dummy variable that takes the value 
                                                        
5 This data set has been used in several other studies of SME financing in Japan (see Kano et al. 
2006). 
6 The two alternative answers to the question were “unchanged” and “lengthened”. 
  9of 1 if the respondent SME answered “lengthened” to the same question.  Again, it seems 
most likely that respondents would interpret this as a lengthening in the “real maturity” of 
trade credit.   
We also construct a dummy variable SHORTEN_TIGHT that takes the value of 1 if 
the respondent SME answered “shortened” to the question on trade credit, “Over the past one 
year, did your company’s terms of payment change?” and answered that this shortening 
resulted in a “tighter financial position”.  In our view this combination of answers can best 
viewed as describing a shortening in the “real maturity” of trade credit that materially 
affected the SME’s access to external finance.
7
  For Equation (2) we use a variety of alternative proxies to measure the amount of 
trade credit:  TC_ASSET_RATIO is the ratio of trade credit to total assets; 
TC_LOAN_RATIO is the ratio of trade credit to total outstanding loans;   
TC_SHORT_RATIO is the ratio of trade credit to total outstanding short-term loans; and 
TC_TURNOVER is the trade credit turnover in days (i.e., (trade credit)/[(cost of goods sold 
per day)]).
8  We note here that TC_TURNOVER could just as easily be interpreted as a 
measure of one of the terms of trade credit – the length of the real maturity dimension of the 
trade credit contract.  To the extent that the actual payment time coincides with the real 
maturity terms offered by suppliers, TC_TURNOVER will be a good proxy for the real 
maturity.  However, to the extent that a firms pays early or late (before or after the real 
maturity), it will not. 
  Our key independent variable, LENGTH_TC, is our proxy for the strength of the 
                                                        
7 We could not construct a comparable dummy variable LENGTHEN_EASY because of limited 
observations. 
8 More precisely, in the Japanese context trade credit equals the sum of “notes payable” and 
“accounts payable”.  Because notes payable and accounts payable are both credit extended by the 
supplier of goods to the buyer, they represent credit extended in conjunction with trade.  
  10buyer-seller relationship.  Specifically, LENGTH_TC is the length in years of the relationship 
between the SME and its main supplier.  We use this variable to test our main hypothesis that 
trade creditors are relationship lenders.  This variable is the exact counterpart to the variable 
most often used as a measure of the strength of the borrower-bank relationship in the bank 
lending literature (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995, Berger et al. 2005).  
A finding of a negative (positive) coefficient on LENGTH_TC in our terms of trade credit 
tests (Equation (1)) when SHORTEN and SHORTEN_TIGHT (LENGTHEN) is our proxy 
for the terms of trade credit would support the hypothesis that trade creditors are relationship 
lenders.  A finding of a positive coefficient on LENGTH_TC in our amount of trade credit 
tests (Equation (2) for any of our proxies) would also support the hypothesis.
9
  Another key independent variable relates to information verifiability.  We use the 
same proxy here as used in Kano et al. 2006, a dummy variable representing the availability 
of audited financial documents.  This dummy variable, AUDIT, takes the value of one if the 
SME’s financial statements are either audited by certified public accountants or verified by 
licensed tax accountants.  This variable tests for the possibility that trade creditors use the 
financial statement lending technology in deciding on the extension of, and terms of, trade 
                                                        
9 We note that, due to data limitations, the construction of our dependent and key independent 
variables are not entirely consistent with each other and this may bias our analysis against finding 
evidence that trade creditors are relationship lenders.  The dependent variables reflect the overall 
terms of trade credit.  They are best interpreted as the average terms of trade credit across all 
suppliers in our terms regressions, and the total amount of trade credit in our quantity regressions.  
However, our key independent variable is based on only the strength of the relationship with one 
trade supplier – the “main” supplier.  To the extent that the main supplier, however, is the most 
important supplier in setting the average terms and the total supply of trade credit, we may be 
able to capture a statistical association between the trade credit and the strength of the buyer-seller 
relationship.  The bias tends to go in one direction – a bias against finding that relationship 
strength matters.  We note that the data give us an opportunity to significantly mitigate this 
problem based on additional information in the survey about the importance of the main supplier.  
In subsequent analysis we will exploit this additional information. 
  11credit.
10  
Finally, as control variables, we include variables to represent: the firm’s financial 
performance, firm characteristics, the entrepreneur’s characteristics, industry dummies, and 
regional dummies.
11  These variables control for firm risk, industry performance and risk, and 
regional economic differences.  We also control for the characteristics of the SMEs’ main 
bank which may affect the dependence of the SME on trade credit.  Details of these variables 
are found in the Data Appendix. 
We also test in our analysis the possibility that trade credit and bank lending are 
complimentary activities.  Specifically we test whether the strength of the buyer-seller 
relationship affects the terms of bank credit.  Here our tests take the form:  
 
Terms of bank loans = f (strength of the buyer-seller relationship, firm and  
entrepreneur control variables, regional and bank controls)    (3) 
 
We use two alternative measures of the terms of bank loans: the bank loan interest 
rate and a dummy variable indicating whether the SME pledges collateral to its main bank.  
The loan interest rate, SHORT_RATE, is the highest annual short-term borrowing rate with 
                                                        
10  Recent literature on SME financing has departed from the earlier view that SME lending 
consists of only two lending technologies – relationship lending which commercial lenders use to 
lend to opaque SMEs, and transactions lending which commercial lenders use to lend to 
transparent SMEs.  This new literature argues that there are many types of transactions lending 
technologies that commercial lenders can use to provide credit mostly to opaque SMEs including 
leasing, factoring, asset-based lending, equipment lending, real estate lending and financial 
statement lending (Berger and Udell 2002, 2006).  These papers, however, argue that financial 
statement lending is necessarily associated with transparent borrowers because the audited 
financial statements make the borrower transparent.  Our inclusion of audited financial statements 
as an independent variable controls for the possibility that trade creditors may, in fact, be financial 
statement lenders. 
11 Entrepreneur characteristics are defined by those of the firm’s representative, which is usually a 
CEO. 
  12terms less than one year from the main bank as of October 31, 2002.  The collateral dummy, 
COLLATERAL, takes a value of one if the SME pledges collateral (property) to the main 
bank.  Equation 3 investigates the possibility that the intensity of monitoring conducted by 
key suppliers affects the underwriting decision of bankers.  A negative coefficient on the 
LENGTH_TC (the strength of the buyer-seller relationship) would be consistent with the 
view that emphasizes that trade creditors are superior monitors vis-à-vis banks (Cook 1999, 
and Miwa and Ramseyer 2005) and/or that banks rely on the monitoring of trade credit in 
extending and setting their terms of credit (Cook 1999, Biais and Gollier 1997). 
 
IV.  Results 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used 
in our sample.  Additional information about the distribution of our dependent variables for 
Equation (1), SHORTEN, SHORTEN_TIGHT, and LENGTHEN, are shown in Table A1.  
For our key dependent variable the average length of the relationship between the SME and 
its main supplier is 29 years.   These data show that our sample firms are on average medium 
sized with average assets of 2.8 billion yen and with an average of 79 employees.  The 
average firm age is forty-seven years old.  Forty-five percent of firms are owner-managed 
(i.e., for forty-five percent of the sample firms, half of the shares are owned by the 
entrepreneur and individuals with the same family name as the entrepreneur’s). 
  The regression results from our tests of Equation (1) are shown in Table 2.  Turning 
first to the SHORTEN regression we note that the coefficient on the length of the buyer-seller 
relationship variable, LENGTH_TC, while negative is not statistically significant.  Thus, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the strength of the relationship does not affect the terms 
of credit (as proxied by SHORTEN which likely reflects changes in the real maturity of the 
  13SME’s overall trade credit).
12  This means that we do not find evidence that trade creditors 
are relationship lenders that accumulate soft information over time using SHORTEN as our 
measure of the terms of trade credit.  That is, we do not find evidence that trade creditors 
have a comparative advantage in monitoring or, more generally, otherwise have a 
comparative advantage in access to private information as suggested in some of the literature 
on trade credit (e.g, Mian and Smith 1992, Biais and Gollier 1997, Cook 1999, Jain 2001, 
Cunat 2005, Miwa and Ramseyer 2005, Fabri and Menichini 2006).  By implication this 
result, by itself, suggests that operations-oriented theories of trade credit may be more 
powerful than financial theories – at least those financial theories that rely on trade creditors 
acquiring private information about overall buyer quality. 
  Our other key independent variable is the availability of audited financial statements, 
AUDIT.  The coefficient on this variable is likewise statistically insignificant.  This suggests 
that trade creditors are not less likely to tighten credit for those firms that can provide 
verifiable financial information.   
  Turning to the other variables in the regression we find that other than the capital 
ratio and firm age the firm financial ratios and firm characteristics are not statistically 
significant.  The negative coefficient on the capital ratio suggests that the financial condition 
of the firm may have some effect on the terms of trade credit.  Not surprisingly it shows that 
firms whose leverage is large are more likely to incur a tightening of credit terms.  The age 
variables indicate that older firms are more likely to suffer a tightening of credit terms than 
younger firms.  This result does not lend itself to any easy interpretation.  We would note here 
                                                        
12 Again we emphasize here that our key independent variable is the length of the relationship 
with a single trade creditor, the SME’s main supplier.  The dependent variable, however, is a 
measure of overall tightening of trade credit.  Thus, it is possible that we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis because the main supplier for many of the respondents does not supply a significantly 
large fraction of trade credit.   
  14that because we have controlled for private information available to the supplier (through the 
buyer-seller relationship strength variable, LENGTH_TC), the age variables proxy for 
information that is publicly available to all creditors (see Berger and Udell 1995).  Thus, the 
positive coefficient suggests that as more publicly available information becomes available 
about the firm, the more likely that trade creditors will tighten credit.  However, the small 
coefficients indicate the effect is relatively small economically. 
  The negative coefficient on GENDER suggests that male owned firms are less likely 
to incur a tightening of trade credit than female-owned firms.  Other characteristics of the 
entrepreneur that may capture the level of human capital are not significant.  One other 
variable is notable.  The positive coefficient on ALL_SERVICE suggests that SMEs in the 
services industry are more likely to incur a tightening of trade credit terms.  This may reflect 
that service firms are more opaque although the lack of statistical significance on any of the 
tangible asset variables seems to contradict this interpretation. 
  In the second regression in Table 2 the dependent variable is LENGTHEN.  In some 
sense this alternative specification of Equation (1) can be viewed as the mirror of the first 
regression where SHORTEN was the dependent variable.  However, these may not 
necessarily be symmetric tests – that is, a meaningful lengthening of the real maturity may 
not necessarily be the inverse equivalent of a meaningful shortening (at least in the view of 
the respondent).  Regarding the key coefficient, the relationship strength LENGTH_TC, the 
result is the same: statistical insignificance.  Again, here we do not find evidence to support 
the hypothesis that trade creditors are relationship lenders. 
  The third equation in Table 2 has SHORTEN_TIGHT as its dependent variable.  This 
is a somewhat stronger version of the first equation where the respondent firm indicates that 
  15not only was the maturity of trade credit shortened, but in addition this shortening had 
“tightening” effect on its financial condition.  The results here are qualitatively similar to the 
first regression with SHORTEN as the dependent variable.  In particular, the two key 
independent variables, LENGTH_TC and AUDIT are both insignificant. 
  Now we turn to Equation 2 in Table 3 where the dependent variable is the quantity of 
trade credit measured in a variety of different ways.  Again our alternative dependent 
variables are TC_ASSET_RATIO, TC_LOAN_RATIO, TC_SHORT_RATIO, and 
TC_TURNOVER where the last ratio is the trade credit turnover in days.  In all four 
regressions the coefficient on the relationship strength variable, LENGTH_TC, was positive 
and statistically significant – at least at the 10% level.  It is interesting to note that this result 
is robust across all four specifications.  The different specifications capture in the dependent 
variable alternative measures of trade credit availability.   For example, while the numerator 
of the dependent variable, the amount of trade credit, is the same in each of the first three 
regressions, the denominators are quite different.  Together, these findings show that longer 
trade credit relationships are associated with more trade credit relative to short term loans, all 
loans (short and long term), and relative to all sources of funding (debt plus equity).   
Moreover, the fourth regression suggests something even stronger: that firms draw on more 
trade credit because trade creditors extend credit on more favorable terms to customers with 
longer relationships.  That is, the fourth regression suggests that the substitution of trade 
credit for other forms of financing is in part driven by a willingness on the part of trade 
creditors to extend trade credit on better terms for customers with longer relationships.  This 
interpretation stems from the fact that the trade credit turnover (TC_TURNOVER) is a 
measure of the real maturity of trade credit.  That is, TC_TURNOVER is a point in time 
  16estimate of the length of time that the firm is taking to pay its trade obligations.   
The coefficient on AUDIT was positive in all four quantity regressions but 
statistically significant in only two.  This is weakly suggestive that verifiable information is 
associated with more trade credit.  This provides some evidence that trade creditors may also 
be financial statement lenders.  The coefficients on some of the control variables are 
interesting.  The coefficient on LIQUIDITY (the liquidity ratio) is positive and significant in 
three of the specifications.  The exception is the TC_SHORT_RATIO.  One interpretation of 
this combination of results is that ceteris paribus suppliers are more willing to extend trade 
credit the lower the effective “advance rate” is on short term assets (i.e., accounts receivable 
plus inventory).  This is analogous to how asset-based lenders calibrate loan advances against 
accounts receivable and inventory.
13  The sign on the CAPRATIO (=(capital)/(total asset)) is 
not consistent across specifications nor is it always statistically significant.  GENDER is 
always negative and is statistically significant in the TC_ASSET_RATIO regression but 
insignificant in the other three specifications.  The negative and significant finding in the 
TC_ASSET_RATIO is inconsistent with the findings on GENDER in the SHORTEN and 
SHORTEN_TIGHT regressions.  AGE is statistically significant in only one specification and 
it flips sign in the other regressions. 
  Summarizing the quantity regressions we find evidence to support the hypothesis that 
trade creditors are relationship lenders in that the coefficient on our proxy for the strength of 
the relationship is always positive and significant at least at the 10% level.  These results are 
inconsistent with our findings on Equation 1. 
  As we noted earlier our measure of relationship length is not consistent with our 
                                                        
13 See Udell (2004) chapter 6 for a discussion of the calibration of advances against accounts 
receivable and inventory in an asset-based loan context. 
  17measures of the terms of trade credit and the amount of trade credit.  Specifically, the length 
of the trade credit relationship pertains only to the firm’s “main supplier”, while our measures 
of terms of trade credit and the amount of trade credit pertain to all trade credit.  To address 
this problem we exploit another question in the survey that asks firms how dependent they 
are on their “main supplier”.  To exploit this information we narrowed the sample to only 
those firms with 60% dependence.  This has the virtue of allowing for a much closer 
connection between relationship strength and the terms and quantity of trade credit.  That is, 
for this subsample the terms and quantity of trade credit are substantially determined by the 
trade creditor on whom we have information about the strength of the relationship.   There is, 
unfortunately, a trade-off in using this subsample.   Only about 13 percent of the firms were 
greater than 60 percent dependent on their main supplier, so that we have smaller number of 
observation.  In addition, in our terms tests (Equation (1)) we only have enough observations 
to test SHORTEN. 
  The results for these additional tests are shown in Table 4 for the terms tests and 
Table 5 for the quantity tests.  Overall, with respect to relationship strength the results are the 
opposite of what we found in the larger sample.  Specifically, the length of the trade credit 
relationship was highly significant and negative in the SHORTEN regression indicating that 
stronger relationship are associated with a lower likelihood of rationing.  However, in the 
quantity regressions relationship strength was not significant in any of the regressions.   
Interestingly, the results on AUDIT are stronger and consistent with the full sample tests, 
again providing some evidence that trade creditors may be financial statement lenders. 
  We now turn to our final analysis to investigate whether trade credit and bank lending 
may be complimentary activities.  Our tests of Equation (3) are shown in Table 6.   
  18Specifically, we investigate the possibility that the terms with which bankers lend to SMEs 
are favorably affected by the intensity of monitoring conducted by key suppliers.  This view 
of bank lending basically emphasizes that trade creditors are superior monitors vis-à-vis 
banks (Cook 1999, and Miwa and Ramseyer 2005) and/or that banks rely on the monitoring 
of trade creditors in extending and setting their terms of credit (Cook 1999, Biais and Gollier 
1997).  A finding of a negative coefficient on LENGTH_TC in our interest rate regression 
and collateral regression would support this hypothesis.  The coefficient, however, is not 
statistically significant in either regression. 
 
V.  Conclusion  
We examine a longstanding hypothesis in the academic literature that views trade 
creditors as relationship lenders who acquire soft private information about their customers 
over time and use this information to set the terms and the amount of credit that they are 
willing to extend.  A recent taxonomy of the SME credit underwriting suggests that 
relationship lending is one of many lending technologies that can be deployed in extending 
credit to opaque SMEs (Berger and Udell 2006).  Evidence suggests that some banks, 
particularly small banks, have a comparative advantage in SME credit underwriting using the 
relationship lending technology (e.g., Stein 2002, Scott 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan 
and Stein 2005).  Some researchers on trade credit have explicitly argued that suppliers might 
also act as relationship lenders through intensive monitoring of their borrowers including 
recent work in this area (e.g., Cunat 2003 and Miwa and Ramseyer 2005). 
Despite the importance of the hypothesis that trade creditors act as relationship 
lenders, it has been virtually impossible to directly test the hypothesis because of a lack of 
  19data that have information on both 1) the terms of trade credit, and 2) the strength of the 
buyer-seller relationship.  We attempt to overcome this problem by using a relatively new 
Japanese database on small and midsized enterprises (SMEs) that contains information on 
both 1) and 2) as well as, among other things, information about the firm itself. 
We conduct two types of tests, “terms tests” and “quantity tests”.  The first set of 
tests investigates whether the strength of the buyer-seller relationship affects the terms of 
trade credit and the second set of tests investigates whether the strength of the buyer-seller 
relationship affects the quantity of trade credit.  We find some evidence that trade creditors 
may be relationship lenders in both of these tests.  However, the evidence is not robust to 
alternative specifications.  Interestingly, we also find evidence that trade creditors are also 
financial statement lenders.  Again, however, these results are not robust to alternative 
specifications.  
On balance our results can be viewed as only suggestive of the possibility that trade 
creditors acquire private soft information over time and use this information to set the terms 
of trade financing.  This should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with other theories of 
trade credit, such as the operations-oriented theories, because these motivations for trade 
credit are not necessarily mutually exclusive with the relationship lending motivation for 
trade credit. 
 





- Financial statement numbers and ratios 
 
SIZE: total asset 
LIQUIDITY: liquidity ratio = liquid (current) assets / total assets  
CAPRATIO: stockholders equity/total assets (= 1- leverage) 
PPMARGIN: pretax profit margin 
 
- Firm characteristics 
 
PROPERTY: property/total assets 
BUILDING: buildings/total assets 
MACHINERY: machinery/total assets 
VEHICLE: vehicles/total assets 
TOOL: tools/total assets 
LAND: land/total assets 
FAGE: firm age 
FAGE2: square of FAGE 
EMPLOYEE: the number of employees 
OWNER: (dummy) owner or family members have more than half shares 
 
- Entrepreneur characteristics 
 
GENDER: (dummy) the entrepreneur is male 
HOUSING: (dummy) the entrepreneur has his/her own house 
EDUCATION: (dummy) the entrepreneur graduated a college/university/graduate school 









HOKKAIDO: Hokkaido prefecture 
TOHOKU: Tohoku region 
KITAKANTO: North Kanto area 
CHUBU: Chubu area 
KANSAI: Kansai area 
CHUGOKU: Chugoku area 
SHIKOKU: Shikoku area 
KYUSHU: Kyushu area 
 
  21Bank-specific controls* 
 
BTASSET: bank’s total asset 
BTLOANR: loan to asset ratio = total loans / total asset 
BLIQUIDITY: liquid asset index = bank’s liquid asset / total asset 
BCAPR: bank’s capital asset ratio = bank’s book capital/asset ratio 
BCAPR2: square of BCAPR 
BBIS: BIS capital asset ratio 
BBIS2: square of BBIS 
BROA_N = (Net business profit (“Gyoumu Jun-eki” in Japanese)) / BTASSET 
ACQUIRE: (dummy) the bank involved a merger as an acquirer: This dummy equals 1 when 
the firm reports that its main bank experienced a merger with a smaller bank in the past 
five years 
ACQUIRED: (dummy) the bank involved a merger as an acquired: This dummy equals 1 
when the firm reports that its main bank experienced a merger with a larger bank or a 
bank with a similar size in the past five years 
HELD: (dummy) the bank is a subsidiary of a bank holding company 
BNPL_RATE: bad loan ratio = (loans to legally bankrupt companies + past due loans + 
renegotiated loans) / total assets 
BLOSS: ratio of loan loss provision to total asset 
 
 
* In order to examine different effects from bank characteristics, we then linked this survey 
data to bank balance sheet data. For banks under the Banking Act, the data are available from 
the Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File issued by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. For 
Shinkin banks, Financial Statements of Shinkin Banks from the Kin-yu Tosho Consultant 
Corporation is used. These data are as of March 31, 2002, the end of the fiscal year 2001.  We 
dropped firms whose main bank is either Mizuho Bank or Mizuho Corporate Bank.  These 
two banks were established on April 1, 2002 as a result of a three way merger among 
Industrial Bank of Japan, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, and Fuji Bank.  Thus, for those firms that 
reported one of the two Mizuho banks as their main bank as of October 31, 2002, we cannot 
know which of the three banks was their main bank. Note that the Japanese banks’ financial 
closing date that is the most recent from the survey date is March 31, 2002, the end of FY 
2001.  Firms that reported Resona Trust Bank as their main bank are also dropped since it is a 
bank that had succeeded the Daiwa Bank’s trust account.  A trust account is for trust service, 
which cannot be compared with commercial banking service as is represented by a banking 
account.  For other trust banks, measures for their financial health are defined based on their 
ledger accounts related to banking activities.  
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  26N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SHORTEN 1747 0.06 0.25 0 1
LENGTHEN 1747 0.02 0.15 0 1
SHORTEN_TIGHT 1747 0.02 0.15 0 1
LENGTHEN_EASY 1747 0.01 0.09 0 1
TC ASSET RATIO 1396 0.22 0.18 0 1.55
TC LOAN RATIO 1331 1.33 4.13 0 86.66
TC SHORT RATIO 1205 3.37 10.12 0 164.49
TC TURNOVER 1389 134.88 2,257 0 84144.12
Length of relationships LENTGH TC (year) 1747 28.65 14.55 1.00 97.00
SHORT_RATE (%) 1747 2.09 1.05 0 9.999
COLLATERAL 1691 0.81 0.39 0 1
SIZE (thausand yen) 1747 2,783,968.00 5,657,275.00 2,337.00 88,000,000.00
EMPLOYEE (person) 1747 78.54 137.47 2.000 2934.00
FAGE (year) 1747 47.13 26.04 3 378.00
OWNER 1747 0.45 0.50 0 1
Firm characteristics
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Trade Credit Terms
Trade Credit Ratios
Bank Credit TermsSHORTEN=1 SHORTEN=0 SHORTEN=0
and and and
LENGTHEN=0 LENGTHEN=1 LENGTHEN=0
SHORTEN_TIGHT=0 71 43 1,590 1,704
SHORTEN_TIGHT=1 42 0 1 43
LENGTHEN_EASY=0 113 29 1,591 1,733
LENGTHEN_EASY=1 0 14 0 14
Total 113 43 1,591 1,747
Total










LENGTH_TC -0.0004 0.0004 0.333 0.000 0.0002 0.669 0.000 0.0001 0.672
AUDIT -0.0036 0.0099 0.712 -0.003 0.0040 0.376 0.002 0.0033 0.609
log(SIZE) 0.0008 0.0042 0.845 -0.002 0.0016 0.274 0.000 0.0013 0.905
LIQUIDITY 0.0260 0.0544 0.633 -0.025 0.0206 0.221 0.000 0.0181 0.995
CAPRATIO -0.0223 * 0.0123 0.068 -0.016 *** 0.0050 0.000 -0.012 *** 0.0048 0.002
PPMARGIN -0.0380 0.0498 0.445 -0.008 0.0119 0.502 -0.025 * 0.0163 0.079
BUILDING -0.0752 0.0688 0.275 -0.018 0.0247 0.476 0.002 0.0214 0.923
MACHINERY -0.0589 0.0827 0.477 -0.004 0.0233 0.858 -0.044 0.0336 0.201
VEHICLE -0.3433 0.2217 0.124 -0.153 0.1494 0.348 -0.156 0.0995 0.111
TOOL 0.0909 0.1947 0.640 -0.128 0.1457 0.392 0.071 0.0495 0.132
LAND 0.0187 0.0671 0.780 -0.010 0.0253 0.698 0.004 0.0223 0.857
FAGE 0.0017 *** 0.0006 0.005 0.000 ** 0.0002 0.041 0.000 ** 0.0002 0.041
FAGE2 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.033 0.000 0.0000 0.210 0.000 0.0000 0.115
EMPLOYEE -0.0001 0.0001 0.214 0.000 0.0000 0.124 0.000 0.0000 0.376
OWNER -0.0122 0.0104 0.239 0.009 ** 0.0046 0.049 -0.001 0.0034 0.833
GENDER -0.1011 ** 0.0675 0.035 0.002 0.0121 0.906 -0.034 * 0.0330 0.080
HOUSING -0.0043 0.0165 0.791 -0.008 0.0088 0.282 0.006 0.0036 0.182
EDUCATION 0.0037 0.0114 0.750 -0.001 0.0047 0.868 -0.002 0.0041 0.697
AGE -0.0005 0.0006 0.418 0.000 0.0002 0.525 0.000 0.0002 0.546
CONSTRUCT -0.0044 0.0160 0.790 0.008 0.0079 0.229 0.010 0.0098 0.235
All_SERVICE 0.0451 *** 0.0141 0.001 -0.002 0.0045 0.731 0.029 *** 0.0093 0.000
HOKKAIDO -0.0102 0.0252 0.709 -0.002 0.0101 0.870 0.004 0.0118 0.729
TOHOKU 0.0231 0.0270 0.341 0.052 *** 0.0307 0.002 0.021 * 0.0172 0.059
KITAKANTO 0.0552 0.0558 0.209 0.026 0.0307 0.179 0.025 0.0346 0.248
CHUBU 0.0107 0.0202 0.580 0.008 0.0110 0.357 0.014 * 0.0108 0.084
KANSAI -0.0099 0.0176 0.597 0.015 0.0149 0.165 0.001 0.0073 0.874
CHUGOKU 0.0456 * 0.0329 0.090 -0.007 0.0073 0.504 0.017 0.0150 0.101
SHIKOKU 0.0238 0.0361 0.454 -0.003 0.0100 0.779 0.023 0.0243 0.143
KYUSYU 0.0234 0.0308 0.388 0.006 0.0122 0.578 -0.004 0.0065 0.654
log(BTASSET) 0.0102 0.0086 0.235 0.001 0.0027 0.767 0.001 0.0022 0.734
BTLOANR 0.2558 0.2349 0.274 -0.038 0.0944 0.682 -0.051 0.0735 0.484
BLIQUIDITY 0.4098 0.2595 0.112 -0.031 0.0958 0.747 0.009 0.0778 0.903
BCAPR -4.0673 * 2.2458 0.070 1.698 * 1.0178 0.090 -1.455 ** 0.7048 0.020
BCAPR2 39.1846 24.6634 0.112 -9.587 10.3641 0.360 12.870 * 7.0761 0.051
BBIS 0.1083 0.8678 0.901 -0.091 0.3177 0.774 0.479 * 0.2896 0.076
BBIS2 -2.8935 3.7032 0.436 -0.512 1.2284 0.673 -2.297 ** 1.1386 0.029
BROA_N -1.1927 2.7120 0.659 0.649 0.8281 0.434 0.341 0.8650 0.699
ACQUIRE 0.0276 0.0313 0.311 0.001 0.0118 0.961 0.001 0.0086 0.897
ACQUIRED 0.0570 ** 0.0338 0.037 0.004 0.0108 0.657 0.015 0.0141 0.128
HELD -0.0218 0.0220 0.358 0.009 0.0114 0.344 -0.009 0.0061 0.179
BNPL_RATE -0.5155 0.3470 0.137 0.240 * 0.1320 0.064 0.004 0.1043 0.966
BLOSS 0.0448 0.1403 0.750 0.071 0.0683 0.279 0.024 0.0551 0.650
㩷 Number of observations 1747 1747 1747
Wald chi2 68.66 161.890 124.050
Prob > chi2  0.0058 0.0000 0.0000
㩷 Pseudo R2   0.0764 0.164 0.1928
Notes: ***, **, and * represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Industry
dummies
































Intercept Intercept 0.0241 0.2229 0.914 -5.9167 7.0117 0.399 18.5269 17.0234 0.277 23.2359 90.1377 0.797
LENGTH_TC 0.0010 *** 0.0003 0.001 0.0168 * 0.0088 0.057 0.0434 * 0.0246 0.078 0.2861 * 0.1543 0.064
AUDIT 0.0125 0.0080 0.116 0.5132 ** 0.1996 0.010 1.2430 * 0.6460 0.055 3.8774 4.1834 0.354
log(SIZE) -0.0048 0.0037 0.200 0.034 0.0992 0.735 -0.439 0.3114 0.159 6.438 ** 3.0443 0.035
LIQUIDITY 0.4976 *** 0.0452 0.000 4.453 *** 0.8231 0.000 4.558 4.0081 0.256 86.151 *** 18.0953 0.000
CAPRATIO -0.1879 *** 0.0319 0.000 0.847 *** 0.3016 0.005 -3.071 4.0422 0.448 -34.836 *** 7.6522 0.000
PPMARGIN -0.0027 0.0451 0.953 -0.242 0.4032 0.549 3.219 2.6019 0.216 17.434 16.9822 0.305
BUILDING -0.0007 0.0473 0.989 0.076 0.6885 0.912 0.701 4.6771 0.881 -30.612 23.1808 0.187
MACHINERY 0.0090 0.0527 0.864 -0.355 0.8143 0.663 -1.123 5.0792 0.825 16.180 27.9768 0.563
VEHICLE -0.0475 0.1244 0.703 -0.768 1.5097 0.611 8.871 12.7567 0.487 -57.143 42.4912 0.179
TOOL -0.2095 0.1385 0.131 -3.060 2.3783 0.198 -5.949 7.6590 0.437 13.580 129.1154 0.916
LAND 0.1125 ** 0.0465 0.016 0.007 0.6923 0.992 -2.886 4.3604 0.508 48.163 *** 16.2722 0.003
FAGE -0.0002 0.0003 0.459 -0.007 0.0055 0.178 -0.034 ** 0.0168 0.041 0.176 0.1093 0.108
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0000 0.229 0.000 0.0000 0.938 0.000 0.0000 0.205 -0.001 *** 0.0004 0.001
EMPLOYEE 0.0000 0.0000 0.797 0.002 0.0014 0.225 0.003 0.0027 0.243 -0.030 ** 0.0129 0.018
OWNER -0.0116 0.0087 0.180 -0.581 ** 0.2519 0.021 -0.119 0.7008 0.866 -5.469 4.2954 0.203
GENDER -0.0589 ** 0.0264 0.026 -0.161 0.3832 0.675 1.222 1.3904 0.379 -6.635 9.6755 0.493
HOUSING -0.0093 0.0136 0.494 -0.002 0.3987 0.995 0.707 1.0215 0.489 -4.657 5.3469 0.384
EDUCATION 0.0187 ** 0.0091 0.039 0.353 * 0.2057 0.086 0.232 0.6453 0.719 7.427 ** 3.7632 0.049
AGE 0.0003 0.0004 0.436 -0.003 0.0093 0.759 -0.052 0.0405 0.195 0.317 ** 0.1571 0.044
CONSTRUCT -0.0292 *** 0.0102 0.004 0.868 ** 0.4067 0.033 0.233 1.0126 0.818 -9.795 ** 4.1043 0.017
All_SERVICE 0.0412 *** 0.0092 0.000 0.774 *** 0.2157 0.000 1.199 * 0.7008 0.087 1.988 5.6880 0.727
HOKKAIDO -0.0026 0.0208 0.902 1.374 0.8831 0.120 -2.358 2.7076 0.384 -10.776 8.1758 0.188
TOHOKU 0.0017 0.0184 0.928 0.114 0.3682 0.758 -1.722 2.2980 0.454 -11.877 7.9005 0.133
KITAKANTO 0.0191 0.0276 0.490 0.740 0.6992 0.290 -0.156 2.1749 0.943 -2.053 8.1538 0.801
CHUBU 0.0042 0.0138 0.759 0.610 0.4113 0.138 -0.422 1.6281 0.795 -2.554 5.2734 0.628
KANSAI 0.0192 0.0148 0.194 0.332 0.4785 0.487 0.347 1.6692 0.835 16.860 10.9055 0.122
CHUGOKU 0.0022 0.0181 0.905 0.053 0.2831 0.851 -1.069 1.7613 0.544 -10.389 9.1738 0.258
SHIKOKU 0.0023 0.0221 0.918 0.422 0.3564 0.237 -0.816 1.5164 0.591 -11.638 11.1169 0.295
KYUSYU -0.0121 0.0188 0.521 0.430 0.4259 0.313 -0.484 1.8795 0.797 7.933 17.5175 0.651
log(BTASSET) -0.0133 ** 0.0065 0.041 0.092 0.1238 0.459 -0.427 0.3264 0.191 -4.896 * 2.6839 0.068
BTLOANR 0.0637 0.1678 0.704 3.498 6.5706 0.595 -5.480 15.0072 0.715 42.727 72.9102 0.558
BLIQUIDITY 0.0556 0.1906 0.770 5.810 7.9539 0.465 9.762 22.5548 0.665 26.727 85.3586 0.754
BCAPR -0.0923 1.7915 0.959 -85.916 * 46.0588 0.062 -123.645 115.7130 0.286 -568.091 734.7853 0.440
BCAPR2 -31.3376 19.0551 0.100 753.397 488.1863 0.123 769.556 1115.3510 0.490 2382.108 7524.6170 0.752
BBIS 1.9066 *** 0.6432 0.003 11.634 10.5424 0.270 -22.387 38.5006 0.561 163.971 314.8370 0.603
BBIS2 -1.8934 2.4919 0.447 -120.170 ** 59.6010 0.044 -60.511 162.5426 0.710 -477.290 1028.2640 0.643
BROA_N -1.3815 2.0997 0.511 21.946 62.5844 0.726 104.221 99.9579 0.297 -168.649 1006.8660 0.867
ACQUIRE -0.0329 * 0.0197 0.095 -0.227 0.7557 0.764 -1.128 1.6897 0.504 -0.820 7.4986 0.913
ACQUIRED -0.0149 0.0154 0.334 -0.526 0.4814 0.275 -1.046 1.1775 0.374 -4.992 5.4800 0.363
HELD 0.0220 0.0172 0.203 0.705 0.9122 0.440 2.276 1.5928 0.153 1.084 6.5156 0.868
BNPL_RATE 0.3012 0.2695 0.264 -2.955 5.4393 0.587 -4.996 16.0493 0.756 -165.104 208.2306 0.428
BLOSS 0.1106 0.0721 0.125 1.418 2.9864 0.635 8.036 * 4.4801 0.073 68.606 * 38.5270 0.075
Number of observations 1318 1260 1138 1316
F value 16.8000 3.4600 1.5400 5.5300
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0161 0.0000
R-squared 0.4070 0.0999 0.0577 0.0954
Notes: ***, **, and * represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 3  Trade Credit Quantity Regressions
TC_LOAN_RATIO TC_ASSET_RATIO TC_SHORT_RATIO





















Dependent variable TC_TURNOVERRobust Std.
Err.
P>|z|
LENGTH_TC -0.0010 *** 0.0006 0.003
AUDIT 0.0027 0.0057 0.668
log(SIZE) -0.0082 *** 0.0045 0.002
LIQUIDITY 0.0686 ** 0.0492 0.050
CAPRATIO -0.0041 0.0145 0.766
PPMARGIN -0.1560 0.1047 0.115
BUILDING 0.0094 0.0431 0.826
MACHINERY 0.1077 ** 0.0660 0.018
VEHICLE -0.2596 * 0.1867 0.088
TOOL 0.4648 *** 0.2943 0.007
LAND 0.0541 0.0506 0.187
FAGE 0.0030 *** 0.0017 0.000
FAGE2 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.001
EMPLOYEE -0.0002 *** 0.0001 0.001
OWNER -0.0076 0.0068 0.212
GENDER -0.1244 0.2607 0.280
HOUSING 0.0094 0.0072 0.229
EDUCATION 0.0078 0.0076 0.212
AGE -0.0012 *** 0.0007 0.000
CONSTRUCT -0.0141 ** 0.0095 0.020
All_SERVICE 0.0160 0.0121 0.103
Regional NORTH 0.0364 0.0409 0.173
CHUBU 0.0167 0.0279 0.422
KANSAI -0.0023 0.0113 0.851
SOUTH 0.0217 0.0375 0.411
log(BTASSET) 0.0038 0.0047 0.401
BTLOANR -0.0532 0.1134 0.645
BLIQUIDITY -0.0945 0.1403 0.492
BCAPR -3.0488 * 1.9916 0.065
BCAPR2 25.0133 18.2554 0.160
BBIS 1.0229 ** 0.7412 0.050
BBIS2 -3.6459 * 2.1821 0.056
BROA_N 3.4180 ** 2.3314 0.024
ACQUIRE -0.0064 0.0062 0.472
ACQUIRED -0.0045 0.0095 0.710
HELD -0.0028 0.0129 0.838
BNPL_RATE 0.0078 0.2147 0.971
BLOSS 0.3851 ** 0.3074 0.050
Number of observations 225
Wald chi2 60.85
Prob > chi2  0.0107




Notes: ***, **, and * represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at a




Table 4 Trade Credit Term Regressions






















Intercept Intercept 1.2821 ** 0.5059 0.013 -1.5703 6.7545 0.817 62.8773 98.0023 0.523 220.9408 186.0451 0.237
LENGTH_TC -0.0002 0.0009 0.821 -0.0034 0.0133 0.799 0.0936 0.1021 0.361 -0.0354 0.3967 0.929
AUDIT 0.0569 ** 0.0247 0.023 0.9322 *** 0.3191 0.004 2.1046 2.9691 0.480 21.8354 *** 7.8437 0.006
log(SIZE) -0.0100 0.0113 0.379 0.026 0.1251 0.836 -0.634 1.3346 0.636 2.413 4.1346 0.561
LIQUIDITY 0.4711 *** 0.1329 0.001 4.597 *** 1.6383 0.006 40.310 ** 17.9143 0.027 64.450 48.1856 0.184
CAPRATIO -0.2754 *** 0.0614 0.000 0.113 0.8094 0.889 -7.259 4.9538 0.146 -84.622 *** 21.8593 0.000
PPMARGIN 0.0488 0.2257 0.829 -1.884 2.3416 0.423 33.879 25.0033 0.179 259.128 * 134.2074 0.056
BUILDING 0.0417 0.1284 0.746 2.384 1.7192 0.168 55.409 ** 25.0829 0.030 -9.441 56.9880 0.869
MACHINERY 0.0593 0.1705 0.729 3.245 2.0590 0.118 68.664 * 35.5084 0.056 64.926 75.5819 0.392
VEHICLE -1.8687 *** 0.6588 0.005 -18.116 ** 9.1004 0.049 428.523 286.3159 0.138 -425.332 256.9589 0.101
TOOL 1.7603 ** 0.7978 0.029 14.914 9.6191 0.124 301.071 *** 100.8143 0.004 -31.165 253.2479 0.902
LAND 0.2574 ** 0.1274 0.046 1.962 1.5722 0.215 40.820 * 20.7354 0.052 51.748 52.5864 0.327
FAGE -0.0012 0.0032 0.708 -0.007 0.0308 0.825 0.069 0.2603 0.791 -0.423 0.9588 0.660
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0000 0.674 0.000 0.0003 0.620 -0.001 0.0021 0.714 0.005 0.0073 0.523
EMPLOYEE 0.0004 * 0.0002 0.067 0.002 0.0024 0.309 -0.010 0.0286 0.724 0.061 0.0625 0.331
OWNER -0.0068 0.0269 0.800 0.247 0.3554 0.489 3.169 3.0299 0.298 1.349 8.4447 0.873
GENDER -0.0764 0.0917 0.407 -1.548 1.1270 0.172 -9.622 7.1085 0.179 -6.763 23.6171 0.775
HOUSING -0.1063 ** 0.0409 0.011 -1.093 0.8294 0.190 -2.877 3.3474 0.392 -36.081 ** 17.8520 0.046
EDUCATION -0.0206 0.0342 0.547 -0.511 0.4761 0.285 0.204 3.6538 0.956 -12.687 10.4873 0.229
AGE -0.0013 0.0013 0.329 -0.010 0.0135 0.464 -0.376 ** 0.1895 0.050 -0.041 0.4411 0.926
CONSTRUCT -0.1048 *** 0.0387 0.008 -0.608 0.4608 0.189 -0.019 3.8175 0.996 -20.004 13.6609 0.146
All_SERVICE 0.0127 0.0316 0.690 0.327 0.2935 0.267 1.985 3.9469 0.616 -12.255 10.1729 0.231
HOKKAIDO -0.0546 0.0703 0.439 -0.754 0.7979 0.347 -6.702 7.0174 0.342 -1.062 22.0718 0.962
TOHOKU -0.0320 0.0582 0.584 -0.450 0.7462 0.548 -14.059 * 7.2354 0.055 -7.099 17.1246 0.679
KITAKANTO -0.0600 0.0727 0.411 0.268 1.1353 0.814 -8.397 9.9200 0.399 -26.347 19.8661 0.187
CHUBU -0.0385 0.0501 0.443 -1.170 0.7981 0.146 -8.957 8.2002 0.277 -8.559 14.7576 0.563
KANSAI -0.0215 0.0560 0.702 -1.170 0.9372 0.214 -2.945 6.8994 0.671 21.380 18.3904 0.247
CHUGOKU 0.0085 0.0712 0.905 0.158 0.6014 0.793 -14.249 * 8.0595 0.080 -0.226 18.3268 0.990
SHIKOKU -0.0548 0.0637 0.391 -0.243 0.6411 0.705 -8.168 8.1786 0.320 -13.630 17.3302 0.433
KYUSYU -0.0389 0.0620 0.532 -0.779 0.8367 0.354 -9.123 5.5487 0.103 -20.878 17.1487 0.226
log(BTASSET) -0.0292 * 0.0168 0.084 0.181 0.2154 0.402 0.938 1.6232 0.565 -6.891 6.5365 0.294
BTLOANR -1.0230 ** 0.3923 0.010 -2.983 5.2958 0.574 -86.592 87.5726 0.325 -176.667 151.4020 0.246
BLIQUIDITY -0.4848 0.4627 0.297 2.410 5.8401 0.681 13.048 111.1526 0.907 -9.398 187.8261 0.960
BCAPR 0.5518 7.0664 0.938 -106.595 134.1242 0.428 -572.188 608.4126 0.349 2762.095 2287.4190 0.230
BCAPR2 -49.9167 71.1597 0.484 1131.540 1283.6510 0.380 4530.719 7394.1760 0.542 ######### ######### 0.183
BBIS 4.1597 2.5602 0.107 54.571 34.6197 0.118 23.710 198.6733 0.905 -244.660 622.8706 0.695
BBIS2 -13.4657 9.9894 0.180 -330.110 ** 150.7393 0.031 -1168.202 811.2394 0.153 1359.657 2508.3300 0.589
BROA_N 1.0770 5.0018 0.830 -119.610 * 66.8610 0.076 -177.288 580.5617 0.761 1537.930 1508.1890 0.310
ACQUIRE -0.0167 0.0594 0.778 1.590 * 0.8847 0.075 1.524 5.1813 0.769 -29.218 ** 14.1480 0.041
ACQUIRED -0.0389 0.0616 0.529 -0.911 0.5842 0.122 2.628 5.6050 0.640 -7.111 16.2842 0.663
HELD 0.0108 0.0560 0.848 0.121 0.8807 0.891 -11.930 * 7.0587 0.094 10.483 18.8927 0.580
BNPL_RATE 1.1130 0.9635 0.250 33.134 * 18.2059 0.071 60.128 108.1656 0.580 429.303 264.4761 0.107
BLOSS -0.0046 0.5690 0.994 -3.816 6.6086 0.565 -13.039 56.9055 0.819 151.647 169.3037 0.372
Number of observations 161 155 137 160
F value 5.4500 2.3000 1.4100 2.9400
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0003 0.0875 0.0000



















Notes: ***, **, and * represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 5  Trade Credit Ratio Regressions
(for Firms with High Dependence on the Main Supplier)
TC_LOAN_RATIO TC_ASSET_RATIO TC_SHORT_RATIO




Intercept Intercept 9.5048 *** 1.3885 0.000
LENGTH_TC -0.0018 0.0015 0.221 0.0001 0.0007 0.908
AUDIT -0.0678 0.0465 0.145 0.0259 0.0176 0.139
log(SIZE) -0.1154 *** 0.0204 0.000 0.016 ** 0.0073 0.026
LIQUIDITY -0.4443 * 0.2411 0.066 -0.205 ** 0.0983 0.036
CAPRATIO -0.8381 *** 0.2061 0.000 -0.134 ** 0.0550 0.016
PPMARGIN -0.2747 0.2745 0.317 -0.179 0.1498 0.234
BUILDING -0.5006 0.3190 0.117 0.146 0.1289 0.256
MACHINERY -0.4414 0.3489 0.206 -0.323 *** 0.1257 0.010
VEHICLE 0.3920 0.5880 0.505 -0.266 0.2710 0.325
TOOL 1.7935 * 0.9194 0.051 0.872 * 0.5299 0.100
LAND 0.2537 0.2888 0.380 0.559 *** 0.1319 0.000
FAGE 0.0010 0.0016 0.525 0.005 *** 0.0007 0.000
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0000 0.935 0.000 *** 0.0000 0.000
EMPLOYEE -0.0007 *** 0.0002 0.005 0.000 0.0001 0.911
OWNER 0.0966 * 0.0503 0.055 0.068 *** 0.0182 0.000
GENDER -0.1766 0.1420 0.214 -0.034 0.0557 0.577
HOUSING 0.0575 0.0843 0.495 0.059 ** 0.0313 0.039
EDUCATION -0.1536 *** 0.0538 0.004 -0.055 *** 0.0190 0.004
AGE -0.0001 0.0025 0.981 -0.002 * 0.0010 0.060
CONSTRUCT 0.1659 ** 0.0645 0.010 -0.058 ** 0.0289 0.033
All_SERVICE 0.0818 * 0.0492 0.097 -0.066 *** 0.0233 0.003
HOKKAIDO -0.2271 * 0.1305 0.082 -0.018 0.0504 0.709
TOHOKU -0.1747 ** 0.0885 0.048 0.010 0.0377 0.790
KITAKANTO 0.0130 0.1834 0.944 -0.091 0.0717 0.147
CHUBU -0.2051 *** 0.0693 0.003 -0.004 0.0327 0.906
KANSAI -0.1080 0.0694 0.120 0.030 0.0285 0.329
CHUGOKU -0.1742 0.1236 0.159 -0.023 0.0462 0.607
SHIKOKU -0.3670 *** 0.0923 0.000 0.016 0.0452 0.733
KYUSYU -0.2393 ** 0.1094 0.029 0.033 0.0369 0.416
log(BTASSET) -0.2277 *** 0.0400 0.000 -0.032 ** 0.0141 0.025
BTLOANR -3.3164 *** 1.0517 0.002 0.088 0.3553 0.805
BLIQUIDITY -4.1134 *** 1.1422 0.000 0.038 0.4089 0.926
BCAPR 24.7752 * 13.6674 0.070 7.090 * 4.1070 0.083
BCAPR2 -272.5380 ** 137.9727 0.048 -77.180 * 43.3720 0.075
BBIS 1.7263 3.8130 0.651 -1.242 1.5169 0.412
BBIS2 4.7622 13.6780 0.728 9.876 * 5.8612 0.091
BROA_N 34.6644 *** 11.3359 0.002 6.971 5.1407 0.176
ACQUIRE 0.0306 0.1267 0.809 -0.021 0.0411 0.600
ACQUIRED 0.1618 * 0.0951 0.089 0.003 0.0353 0.943
HELD -0.0953 0.1343 0.478 0.038 0.0349 0.293
BNPL_RATE 2.3235 1.5303 0.129 0.784 0.5890 0.183
BLOSS -1.5612 1.6267 0.337 0.171 0.2235 0.444
Number of observations 1747 Number of observations 1691
F value 13.760 Wald chi2 258.26
Prob > F 0.0000 Prob > chi2  0.0000
R-squared  0.2414 Pseudo R2   0.2189
Table 6  Bank Loan / Trade Credit Regressions
Firm's
characteristics







Notes: ***, **, and * represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Bank-specific
controls
Industry
dummies
Coef. dF/dx
Entrepreneur's
characteristics
Regional
dummies